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BOOK REVIEW
USER FRIENDLY CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRAGMATIC
PROCEDURALISM SLOUCHING AWAY FROM
PROCESS THEORY
LINDA S. MULLENIX *
Cases and Materials on Civil Procedure. David Crump, William V.
Dorsaneo, III, Oscar Chase, and Rex Perschbacher. New York: Mat-
thew Bender & Co., Inc. 1987. Pp. xlii, 1005.
INTRODUCTION
Civil procedure as a discipline is suffering an identity crisis of dis-
turbing dimensions, if one takes seriously the critical commentary ap-
pearing in journals and articulated at academic conferences. There is a
palpable unease among scholars and classroom teachers concerning what
civil procedure is and what it ought to be.' Paradoxically, as scholars
increasingly demand some intellectual framework for critically contem-
plating procedural issues,2 casebooks in the field doggedly seem headed
in the opposite direction.3 Through some inscrutable academic principle
of Newtonian physics, as the clamor for a theoretical paradigm grows
louder, civil procedure casebooks quietly are becoming more pragmati-
cally oriented.
This unfortunate trend prompts a number of subsidiary questions.
* Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America Law School; B.A.
1971, City College of New York; M. Phil. 1974, Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University; J.D.
1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See generally Garth, ADR and Civil Procedure. A Chapter or an Organizing
Theme?, 37 J. Legal Educ. 34 (1987); Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Proce-
dure, 37 J. Legal Educ. 41 (1987); Spiegelman, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute
Resolution: The Lawyer's Role and the Opportunity for Change, 37 J. Legal Educ. 26
(1987). These issues also were explored at the AAJS Conference on Civil Procedure in
Charlottesville, Virginia from June 4 through June 9, 1988.
2. See, e.g., Abrams, The New Civil Procedure (Book Review), 32 Wayne L Rev.
1269, 1270-71 (1986) (reviewing Marcus and Sherman's complex litigation text); Bur-
bank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1463, 1464-65 (1987)
(reviewing Marcus and Sherman's complex litigation text and suggesting that an attempt
to postulate an intellectual framework would be premature); Graham, The Persistence of
Progressive Proceduralism (Book Review), 61 Texas L. Rev. 929, 937-48 (1983) (generally
decrying the lack of procedural theory); Sherman, Restructuring the Trial Process in the
Age of Complex Litigation (Book Review), 63 Texas L. Rev. 721, 744 (1984) (reviewing
complex litigation casebooks and suggesting that the texts "are a good beginning for the
dialogue that must occur if a coherent and workable methodology of complex litigation is
to develop").
3. See, e.g., D. Crump, W. Dorsaneo, III, 0. Chase, & R. Perschbacher, Cases and
Materials on Civil Procedure (1987) [hereinafter Crump Casebook]; J. Glannon, Civil
Procedure, Examples and Explanations: A Student's Guide to Understanding Civil Pro-
cedure (1987); M. Lipson & R. Catz, Materials on the Process of Federal Civil Litigation
(1988).
1023
1024 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
What is civil procedure, anyway? Assuming that there is some agreed-
upon consensus, why has this discipline failed to develop a coherent in-
tellectual framework for discussion? Is the narrow, pragmatically ori-
ented field of civil procedure antithetical to the formulation of an
overarching theoretical framework? Is the insistently urged quest for
procedural theory ultimately quixotic?4 Are classroom academicians
destined to hew to a pragmatic proceduralism that, at best, will always be
slouching away from some process theory?
Only the obtuse, the uninterested, or the hopelessly miscast procedure
professor could fail to notice the growing gulf between what the market
supplies by way of teaching resources and what the academic critics de-
mand by way of principled, pedagogical (or political) reform. Thus, the
arrival of a new procedure casebook offers a propitious occasion for peer-
ing into and stirring the simmering cauldron of procedural discontent.
Because this casebook so consciously adopts a practical approach to the
subject, its appearance in the stew is likely to occasion some renewed
boiling, toiling, and trouble.
It is no grave criticism of Professors Crump,5 Dorsaneo,6 Chase7 and
Perschbacher' that their casebook is unabashedly practical, though theo-
retically undernourished. Indeed, this casebook joins the parade of tradi-
tional texts on the bookshelf,9 few of which have made that great leap
4. See infra text accompanying notes 18-34.
5. His writings on related matters include Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale L.J. 1 (1986)
(with Arthur Miller), Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships with Their
Judges, 69 Judicature 236 (1986), Crump, What a Legal Assistant Can Do For You, 22
Law Office Economics & Management 453 (1982), and, Crump, Managing a Litigation
Matter, 43 Texas Bar J. 576 (1980). Professor Crump also has written pieces relating to
business regulation, health service liability, evidence and criminal law.
6. His recent writings include Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and
Family Law Litigation, 36 Sw. L.J. 1085 (1983), and Dorsaneo, Creditor and Consumer
Rights, 34 Sw. L.J. 253 (1980).
7. Professor Chase's other major casebooks are Civil Litigation in New York (1983),
and 0. Chase, J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, CPLR Manual (2d ed. 1980). He has
written extensively on New York civil litigation practice for the New York Law Journal.
See Chase, Sanctions in State Courts--Proposed Rule Needs Changes, 198 N.Y.L.J., Oct.
22, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Chase, An 'Orwellian' CPLR?, 191 N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1984, at 1, col.
1; Chase, Form over Substance?, 191 N.Y.L.J., March 27, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Chase, Dis-
covery Reform, 191 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Chase, Confronting Governmental
Wrongs, 190 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Chase, Serving Summons Abroad, 189
N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Chase, Assigned Counsel in Civil Cases, 188 N.Y.L.J.,
July 27, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Chase, Trends and Cross-Trends in Res Judicata, 187 N.Y.L.J.,
May 25, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
8. His writings on related matters include Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reap-
plied: Mr. Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986
Ariz. St. L.J. 585; Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 75
(1985), and Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel. Limiting the Preclusive Effect
of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. Fla. L. Rev. 422 (1983).
9. See, e.g., J. Cound, J. Friedenthal, A. Miller & J. Sexton, Civil Procedure: Cases
and Materials (4th ed. 1985); R. Field, B. Kaplan & K. Clermont, Materials for a Basic
Course in Civil Procedure (5th ed. 1984); J. Landers & J. Martin, Civil Procedure (1981);
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towards a cohesive theory of the subject matter.'I Rather, the casebook
states a more modest goal of outlining the fundamentals of civil proce-
dure in an understandable fashion, accompanied by concrete examples of
real-life litigation."
This is not an intellectually flashy casebook. It is not abstruse, theoret-
ical, or jurisprudential. It certainly is not highbrow stuff. 2 On the con-
trary, the overriding mission of this casebook is to present civil procedure
in an accessible, non-threatening fashion. This casebook's sub rosa
theme, if a casebook can be said to have a hidden message, is that civil
procedure is your friend. In short, students will love it and many acade-
micians will be dismayed.
This essay is divided into two parts. Part One examines the trend in
civil procedure casebooks, placing the Crump text on an historical con-
tinuum moving from the theoretically abstruse to the pragmatically con-
crete. The larger issue entails the potential for development and
integration of a theoretical framework into procedure casebooks, course
materials, and classroom teaching. Although the literature is replete
with critical questioning, an overarching theoretical framework in the
field of civil procedure does not yet exist.13
Part Two centers upon an evaluation of the Crump casebook's prem-
ises, avowed goals, and success. This Review's thesis is that in their at-
tempts to render civil procedure "user friendly"' 4 to first year students,
the authors have reverted to a style of presentation that amounts to little
more than casebook spoon-feeding. While clarity and conciseness are
laudable goals, their enshrinement in a first-year casebook contravenes
many of the pedagogical goals traditionally associated with first-year
courses.
D. Louisell, G. Hazard, Jr. & C. Tait, Cases and Materials on Pleading and Procedure-
State and Federal (5th ed. 1983); M. Rosenberg, H. Smit & H. Korn, Elements of Civil
Procedure-Cases and Materials (4th ed. 1985).
10. There are some notable exceptions, however, where authors have attempted to
raise policy issues or ethical considerations in their materials. See, eg., P. Carrington &
B. Babcock, Civil Procedure-Cases and Comments on the Process of Adjudication (3d
ed. 1983); R Cover, 0. Fiss & L Resnick, Procedure (1988); H. Fink & M. Tushnet,
Federal Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice (2d ed. 1987); D. Karlen, I Meisenholder, G.
Stevens & A. Vestal, Civil Procedure-Cases and Materials (1975).
11. See, e.g., Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at v: "We believe that these 'real world'
materials will help the student to understand the theory of civil procedure better, as well
as providing insights into what litigators do." The Crump casebook is reviewed favorably
by Professor Jeffrey B. Berman, who approves of its user friendly approach. See Berman,
Book Review, 55 UMKC L. Rev. 150 (1986).
12. For some examples of highbrow works, see L. Brilmayer, An Introduction to
Jurisdiction in the American Federal System (1986); R. Cover & 0. Fiss, The Structure
of Procedure (1979); R. Cover, 0. Fiss & J. Resnick, supra note 10; and H. Fink & M.
Tushnet, supra note 10.
13. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1463-64 & n.9 (citing G. Hazard, Jr., Research in
Civil Procedure 63 (1963), and Graham, supra note 2, at 946-48).
14. Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at v. This is the casebook authors' own phrase to
describe their endeavor.
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I. SLOUCHING AWAY FROM PROCESS THEORY
It is difficult to predict whether the new Crump civil procedure
casebook will set a trend for similar user friendly course materials. Cer-
tainly this text rests a considerable distance from the pre-Federal Rules
procedure texts, which literally were compilations of common law plead-
ing cases.15 The ascendency of the Federal Rules and federal practice
substantially reshaped procedure casebooks, and in the latter part of this
century, casebooks in all fields began to assume the familiar format of
cases leavened with the author's notes and commentary. 16 In recent
years, the most notable development has been the appearance of texts
organized around a cohesive theory of the subject.17
Civil procedure, as a discrete subject area, has avoided or evaded much
theoretical scrutiny, although there exist at least two types of theory that
might prove useful to proceduralists."' The first is empirical theory-
principles that "would serve to explain the conduct of judges and lawyers
in litigation and enable us to predict how they will respond to changes in
procedural rules."' 9 The second is jurisprudential theory-the ramifica-
tions of some definition of justice for a procedural system."0 Notwith-
15. See, eg., R. Magill & J. Chadbourn, Cases on Civil Procedure (3d ed. 1939).
16. See, e.g., R. Field & B. Kaplan, Materials for a Basic Course in Civil Procedure
(1953). The change in focus and emphasis from pre-Rules casebooks is marked. In the
Preface to their casebook, Professors Field and Kaplan explain their departure from the
traditional approach to teaching procedure: "And in straining either for omnibus cover-
age or for the satisfactions that came from historical exposition, the traditional courses
dwelt too long on the common law and older code systems and gave less than adequate
attention to current practice." Id. at ix. Thus, marking the beginning of a new era for
procedure casebooks, Professors Field and Kaplan suggest that the clear emphasis in the
new casebooks should be the Federal Rules and federal practice:
[Tihe course should give a rounded understanding of a single, modern system of
procedure. The choice naturally falls on the Federal system. The common law
and older codes may come in by way of comparison and as a reading of the
minutes of yesterday's meeting, but the Federal Rules should be a principle
theme.
Id. at ix; see also T. Atkinson & J. Chadbourn, Cases and Other Materials on Civil Proce-
dure (1948) (refocusing on Federal Rules practice and introduction of authors' notes and
supplementary text materials). This refocusing of civil procedure casebooks in the 1950's
is also noted in D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student
Consumerism, 37 J. Legal Educ. 461, 485-86 (1987) (discussed infra note 78).
17. The most visible examples are conflicts of laws texts, see, e.g., R. Cramton, D.
Currie & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments--Questions (4th ed. 1987); R.
Leflar, L. McDougal III & R. Felix, American Conflicts Law (4th ed. 1986); A.
Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Documentary Materials-Federal, State, and International
(1986); W. Reese & M. Rosenberg, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1984); E. Scoles & R. Wein-
traub, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1972); D. Vernon, Conflict of
Laws: Theory and Practice (2d ed. 1982); A. Von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of
Multistate Problems--Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws (1965), and constitutional
law texts, see, e.g., P. Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking-Cases and
Materials (1975); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988).
18. See Graham, supra note 2, at 937.
19. Id
20. See id
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standing these possible avenues of development of procedural theory,
existing casebooks do little to encourage critical thinking. "Indeed, some
of [the casebooks] suggest that their authors share the contemptuous atti-
tude toward the adjective law that is so widespread in the law school
world; the greater part of such books is devoted to 'practical' matters
such as m'astering vocabulary and doctrine .. 2 Therefore,
proceduralists with a theoretical bent must resort to supplementary, re-
produced materials, nurturing scant hope of incorporating such critical
materials into orthodox texts. As Professor Graham observes: "Law
book publishers are notoriously unenthusiastic about idiosyncratic
casebooks ... "22
In the realm of pure scholarship, the critical proceduralist is impeded
by the reigning progressive ideology that defines values, assumptions, and
topics worthy of study: "The proceduralist who wants to write from a
different perspective has no competing paradigm to rely upon. To
reinvent the world of procedure, then explain this new construction so
that others can understand it, before turning to the subject of the re-
search presents a difficult task .... ,23
If this prospect were not dismal enough, the professional ramifications
for the theoretical proceduralist potentially are daunting. These include
unacceptability by student law review editors of submitted works,24
resistance on the part of academic colleagues,25 and unenthusiastic recep-
tion by peer review committees evaluating academic promotion, tenure,
foundation funding, or appointment to procedure reform committees.26
Even more problematic for the development of procedural theory is
21. Id. at 947.
22. IAL Professor Graham also expresses extreme pessimism about the ability of
proceduralists to articulate theory. He notes that the neophyte proceduralist in most law
schools usually does not have much time for critical thought about procedural premises.
Moreover, procedure carries the stigma of being a "service course": it is not taught be-
cause the subject has any intrinsic appeal, but as an adjunct to understanding substantive
courses. See id. at 946-47.
23. Id. at 947. The nub of Professor Graham's pessimism is his belief that the profes-
sion is largely a captive of the ideology of "progressive proceduralism." This ideology is
characterized by: (1) Anglomania; (2) the idea that judicial power is legitimized by the
procedures employed, rather than the justice of decisions; (3) the consistent use of instru-
mental justifications for procedural rules; (4) the belief that a trial is a scientific inquiry,
rather than a political struggle; (5) the drive for procedural uniformity; and (6) the belief
that procedure is a value-free science. See id. at 940-45.
24. See id. at 947.
25. As Professor Graham observes:
While few scholars would deliberately give low marks to a work of merit be-
cause they did not share the author's ideology, the dominance of Progressive
proceduralism is such that it is easy to mistake merit with adherence to the
tenets of Progressivism. And as those who are not Progressives can attest, it is a
devilishly difficult business to be fair to a piece of work based on principles you
abhor.
Id.
26. See id at 947-48. Professor Graham recognizes these problems as essentially pru-
dential concerns. See id
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the discipline's somewhat unique claim to scientific validity.27 To chal-
lenge the premises of procedural principles is to engage in a question of
values, and scientific rules are supposed to be value-free. From this per-
spective, then, civil procedure claims a legitimacy unique in the law
school curriculum by virtue of its unarticulated premise of being value-
free. Traditional procedure professors, many of whom unthinkingly ac-
cept this ideology, have a great deal to lose by challenging the basic
premises of the subject.28
Thus, the quest for a theoretical framework for procedure is inherently
threatening, containing within it the potential for undermining the legiti-
macy of the rules. If procedural rules can claim no special authority as
the rules that determine the course of decision on the substantive merits,
then critical procedural theory threatens conventional notions of justice
as well. Therefore, traditional procedural ideology embodies powerful
disincentives for those who would pursue process theory. 9
In 1963, Professor Hazard observed that "[w]ith but few exceptions,
the product of procedural scholarship in the last 25 years is conspicu-
ously bare of any serious attention to what might be called the philoso-
phy of procedure.",30 Twenty-five years later, with rare exceptions,3' the
same assessment remains true. Clearly, much work remains to be done.
27. See id. at 944.
28. "Progressive proceduralism is a useful ideology for academics because it enhances
their power. If procedure is a 'science,' then academic experts who have studied it have a
better claim to influence than lawyers and judges whose authority is based on greater
experience in dealing with procedural problems." Id. at 948.
29. Professor Graham further stresses:
Only the complacent or the ideologically blinded can avoid the issue of the
complicity of rules of procedure in fostering inequality. But this is ultimately a
question of values, of choosing sides in a deeply political struggle-it cannot be
answered by "scientific" methods. To come down on the side opposing the
status quo is not simply to take up arms against very powerful interests, it is
also to abandon the posture of political neutrality that many proceduralists see
as their sole claim to authority.
Id. at 948.
Professor Graham concludes that it is not surprising that so many procedure teachers
turn to active scholarship in other fields. His discouraging perspective, however, fails to
account for the relative success of the exploration of theoretical premises in other areas of
the law. Certainly, the prudential concerns he identifies exist for all young scholars, re-
gardless of academic interests. Innovative, critical thinking, and especially speculative
theorizing, always has been a professionally risky undertaking. Nonetheless, many young
scholars in other disciplines have pursued the difficult questions, ignoring potential pro-
fessional consequences. Nor does his thesis account thoroughly for the failure of estab-
lished scholars to think broadly about procedure, when such scholarship more likely
would be received, if not embraced, by colleagues. Similarly, the argument that the fail-
ure of procedural theorizing is political explains too much and too little. The charge that
theoretical speculation endangers the very legitimacy of the endeavor applies equally to
"substantive" law. Nonetheless, scholars in other fields have accepted the challenge to
examine critically the premises of their subjects, even if such theoretical scrutiny ulti-
mately questions the legitimacy of received propositions.
30. G. Hazard, Jr., Research in Civil Procedure 63 (1963) (cited in Burbank, supra
note 2, at 1464 n.9).
31. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1464.
[Vol. 561028
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The challenge is to encourage a discipline with an avowedly practical
orientation towards thinking more broadly and critically about underly-
ing premises. 32 A new generation of scholars is beginning to examine
procedural variations from the norm of trans-substantive procedure em-
bodied in the Federal Rules.33 With various procedural reforms under-
way,34 the time is propitious for the articulation of a philosophy of
procedure to serve both as a basis for reform, as well as a legitimating
authority.
II. USER FRIENDLY CIVIL PROCEDURE
With this challenge in mind, the Crump casebook dramatically illus-
trates the widening gulf between theoretical thinkers and classroom
pragmatists. The authors of the Crump casebook note that their book is
"mostly traditional in approach, ' 35 organized to track a litigation from
jurisdiction through posttrial motions and appeals. Also, "[flor the most
part,"36 it avows to utilize the traditional case method. The book in-
cludes all the standard cases one would expect in a basic text, 37 is ex-
tremely current in its case coverage,38 and displays no glaring omissions.
In its highly unpretentious manner, it feigns no attempt at procedural
theory, either grand or unassuming.
In addition to "careful" case selection, the book utilizes four devices to
organize its subject matter: (1) actual litigation documents, including
pleadings, motions, briefs, and orders;39 (2) separate chapter comments
32. As Burbank observes:
The challenge for the law reformer is not to get carried away: not to let one set
of practical problems characteristic of complex litigation preclude attention to
others, not to let images of complex litigation preclude attention to litigation
that is not complex, not to let practical problems preclude attention to process
values other than efficient administration, and not to consider process values in
the vacuum of trial or pre-trial procedure.
Id. at 1487 (footnotes omitted).
33. See id at 1473-74 & nn.58-61.
34. See id at 1487 & nn.138-40.
35. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at v.
36. Id
37. The cases included run from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) (jurisdiction) through Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (preclu-
sion doctrines).
38. Among the cases included are: Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S.
Ct. 1026 (1987) (jurisdiction); Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987) (Erie
doctrine); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal
question jurisdiction); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judg-
ment); Schiavone v. Fortune, Inc., 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (Rule 15 amendments to pleading);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (class action jurisdiction and choice
of law); multiple excerpts from Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.
1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (supersedeas bonds, see Crump Casebook, supra note
3, at 826; judgment liens, see id at 927); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762
F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (Rule I 1 sanctions), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (federal common law).
39. See, eg., Appendix to Chapter 2, The Anatomy of a Forum Contest: Litigation
1988] 1029
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entitled "Improving the System" aimed at theoretical discussion;40 (3) in-
corporation of comparative procedural practice from the benchmark
states of California, New York, and Texas;41 and (4) problems.42 While
the overall casebook concept is thoughtful and enticing, the book
promises more than it delivers.
The prefatory comments to the text reveal a disturbing underlying
pedagogical philosophy. For example, the two stated principles guiding
case selection and redaction are quite interesting. The authors express a
preference for current cases, so they illustrate most doctrines with post-
1980 decisional law. While in itself a harmless preference, the authors
send an implicit message that there is something distasteful about having
to read musty old cases. The authors' second principle of selection is less
innocent: "We also have attempted to use cases with simple, clear, cor-
rect reasoning, on the theory that teaching from a correctly reasoned
case is more effective than criticizing a 'wrong' decision."43 This seem-
ingly innocuous premise embodies the fundamentally distressing problem
with this casebook venture: that students are not to be bothered with the
complex, the unclear, the difficult, the challenging--or, heaven help us-
the wrongly decided case. In their efforts to create the ultimate "user
friendly" first-year casebook, the authors quite successfully have sani-
Documents in George Miller Co. v. Compudata, Inc., Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at
151-72; Appendix to Chapter 3, Jurisdictional Documents in Kawasaki Motors Corp. v.
Edgerton, id. at 229-40; Appendix to Chapter 5, Sample Pleadings from Three Jurisdic-
tions, id. at 356-65 (New York: Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.; Texas: Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco Inc.; and California: Pre-Printed Products Liability Complaint Form); Appendix
to § 9.02: Summary Judgment Documents in Browne v. Smith, id. at 634-42.
40. See, e.g., § 2.05, Improving Our System of Personal Jurisdiction and Venue:
Notes and Questions, Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 148-50; § 3.04, Improving Our
Jurisdictional Systems, id. at 222-28; § 4.05, Improving the System of Federal-State
Choice of Law: Notes and Questions, id. at 280-81; § 5.08, Improving the Rules of
Pleading: Notes and Questions, id. at 354-55; § 7.06, Improving the Discovery Rules:
Notes and Questions, id. at 575-77; § 8.04, Improving Pretrial Conferences and Case
Management: Notes and Questions, id. at 612-13; § 9.06, Improving Summary Judgment
and Other Non-Trial Disposition Methods: Notes and Questions, id. at 650-51; § 10.09,
Improving Trial Processes: Notes and Questions, id. at 761-63.
41. See, e.g., Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 144-48 (venue in state systems); id. at
349-54 (state court pleadings today: stating a "cause of action" under modern rules); id.
at 356-65 (sample pleadings from three jurisdictions).
42. Problems are sprinkled throughout the text. See, e.g., Problem A on jurisdiction,
Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 87-88. The authors' philosophy concerning the
casebook problems is set forth in the Preface:
For the most part, the problems in earlier chapters are simple (often, in fact, we
have put suggested answers in the book). In this difficult course, it happens all
too often that a complex problem is not as helpful to the real goal of student
understanding as a simpler one that clearly illustrates the application of the
principles the student has learned. In later chapters, some of the problems are
more difficult, but we have remained faithful to the idea that problems should
be within the abilities of students who have read and understood the materials.
Id. at vi. This philosophy is consistent with the authors' overarching philosophy of ren-
dering civil procedure "user friendly." See infra text accompanying notes 49-77.
43. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at vi.
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tized an entire subject and helped trivialize other pedagogical purposes of
first year law school.
Thus, this is a well-intentioned but questionable endeavor. The con-
cept of this casebook is fine, and many of its special features are deserv-
ing of emulation. Noteworthy is the supplementation of traditional
casebook analysis with real-life litigation documents." Many procedure
teachers enhance the course with sample pleadings, motions, and other
litigation documents, and, therefore, a text that integrates these materials
is a welcome addition to the existing literature. Similarly, the incorpora-
tion of comparative state statutory provisions helps to correct the over-
whelming federal perspective inherent in first-year procedure courses and
to remind students that differences exist between federal and state
practice.4'
Commendably, the authors have attempted to provide some larger per-
spective on procedural issues. They accomplish this by tacking onto each
chapter a segment entitled "Improving the System," which is aimed at
"Introducing Theoretical Issues at the Cutting Edge of the Law."46 The
authors explain:
We would not be content, however, with introducing the student to
current practice. A good lawyer needs to be able to grow with the law.
In fact, he or she needs to think ahead of the current state of the
law.... Our experience indicates that this method encourages deeper
thought about the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure.47
Unfortunately, more often than not, the commentaries consist of fuzzy
attempts to raise consciousness, leaving one to speculate about the level
of theoretical discussion engendered by these "Improving the System"
notes.48
The major criticism of the text, however, goes to the overarching peda-
gogical approach to the course materials:
44. See supra note 39; cf. P. Simon, The Anatomy of a Lawsuit (1984) (hypothetical
lawsuit developed through sample pleadings and motions).
45. The authors tend to describe narratively state statutory provisions and then indi-
cate the significant differences in approach and practice, rather than simply providing the
statutes. See supra note 41. There is something to be said, however, for having students
read and construe statutory material, unmediated by author interpretation. For a differ-
ent approach to state statutory materials in civil procedure, see J. Cound, J. Friedenthal,
A. Miller & J. Sexton, 1987 Civil Procedure Supplement 274-81 (1987).
46. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at v.
47. Id.
48. For example, see the following introductory note on "Improving Trial Processes":
(1) Providing Jury Trial in the Right Cases (and Not in the Wrong Ones?) Jury
trials seem most important in cases in which citizens' perceptions of the balance
of interests might diverge from the views of government, and when the issues
are related to those in common experience. To the extent that there is constitu-
tional room not to provide a jury, however, it may be appropriate to consider
the fact that jury trials are more unpredictable, much more expensive for all
concerned, and more likely to produce delay.
Crump Casebook, supra note 3, § 10.09, at 761.
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A "User Friendly" Book. Above all, we have tried to produce a book
that makes the fundamentals easy for the student to grasp. Although
Civil Procedure may be the most difficult course in the first-year cur-
riculum (we have no illusions of making it truly simple), we have done
our best to make our book 'user friendly.' For example, particularly
difficult cases are preceded by notes entitled 'How to Read this Case.'
The cases are edited with student comprehension in mind, and expla-
nations of difficult principles are inserted in brackets. In a few in-
stances, difficult cases are preceded by problems designed to prepare
the student in advance. Our notes and questions are self-contained;
they do not require the student to consult outside sources. Our philos-
ophy is that is it [sic] best for the student to come to class having
actually understood the material in the book. The class then does not
need to consist solely of helping to get across the basics, and the pro-
fessor can raise more interesting issues.4 9
This desire to create a "user friendly" casebook results in a caricature
of a first-year text. Not only is the book's tone of voice problematic, 50
but the approach is subtly opposed to the development of critical think-
ing. Under the guise of user friendliness, the authors offer predigested
statements of black letter law,5 simplified case statements, 5 2 and sum-
mary outlines of complex doctrines.5 3 In their efforts to make the
"study" of civil procedure as painless as possible, the authors not only
narratively describe what the law is, but also helpfully explain what it
49. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at v-vi.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
51. See, e.g., "Note on the Standards For Summary Judgment," Crump Casebook,
supra note 3, at 39. The note in part reads:
Because this procedure dispenses with the need for a trial, the moving party
bears a heavy burden. It is not enough for the moving party to show that he is
likely to win at trial; he must demonstrate that there are not even any contro-
versies about the facts that could make any difference in the result.
Id.
52. See, e.g., Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 130 (summarizing Billy v. Ashland
Oil Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984)). Although this case is noted and summarized,
the summary does not adequately make the point that a plaintiff faces an election of
process methods under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C), either by state or by federal means.
See id. Indeed, the section on the mechanics of service of process makes scant mention of
the provisions of amended Rule 4. See id. at 125-31. Since 1983, the Rule 4 amend-
ments, particularly those to Rules 4(c)(2)(C) and 4(j), have generated a large body of case
law and critical commentary. See, e.g., Jarvis & Mellman, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure: From Hapless to Hopeless, 61 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1986);
Mullenix, The New Federal Express: Mail Service of Process Under Amended Rule 4, 4
Rev. of Litigation 299 (1985); Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and
Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 Va. L. Rev. 1183 (1987). For a
casebook with such an avowedly practical orientation, this failure to explore the amended
Rule 4 provisions is surprising.
53. See, e.g., Crump Casebook, supra note 3, § 4.02: "The Substance-Procedure Dis-
tinction, Note on the Supreme Court's Varying Approaches to the Substance-Procedure
Problem," id. at 250; § 6.01: "An Overview of the Devices for Joining Multiple Parties
or Claims," id. at 367-74; § 6.03[B][2]: "Note on Understanding Rule 23," id. at 418-19;
§ 13.01: "Res Judicata: Claim Preclusion," id. at 849-50.
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means.5 4 At its worst, the text oversimplifies complex legal problems or
offers vague and ambiguous descriptions of doctrine."5
Some of these criticisms obviously touch on matters of personal taste.
The appeal of the text's tone of voice, for example, clearly depends on
individual readers' sensibilities. While some students may find the au-
thors' notes a friendly reprieve from sterner texts, many students will
find the prefatory comments patronizing and paternalistic.56 This is an
incessantly chatty casebook. As if students could not discover it for
themselves, the authors repeatedly assure its readers that a case that fol-
lows is "very difficult" and its facts "extremely complex."57 Because
54. See, eg., the authors' note preceding United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966), concerning the rationale and scope of pendent jurisdiction:
Judge-Created Jurisdictional Doctrines. In this situation, federal judges have lit-
erally invented ajurisdictional doctrine. The authority to hear the state claim is
called 'pendent jurisdiction.' (The word 'pendent' comes from a Latin root
meaning "to hang"; the state claim comes into federal court figuratively 'hang-
ing' from the federal claim.) It might seem ironic that the federal courts
(which, after all, are so concerned about jurisdiction that they sometimes dis-
miss after judgment) would go about inventing jurisdiction. But the invention
of pendent jurisdiction is justified, in that the disadvantage to the claimant
would otherwise be so significant that the choice of a federal forum would be
penalized.
Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 201.
55. See eg., id at 195-96 (text's treatment of the problem of collusive joinder under
28 U.S.C. § 1359). This summary treatment and the vague case descriptions in Note (2)
fail to define or illustrate the issues raised by a large body of case law. The book draws no
distinction between cases that seek to create jurisdiction and cases that seek to destroy
jurisdiction (technically not encompassed by the statute), nor is there any suggestion of
the doctrinal difficulties-indeed, a split among the circuits-raised by Kramer v. Carib-
bean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). Instead, the issue of collusive joinder is treated in a
cursory fashion. Cf Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There
Diversity After Death?, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 1011 (1985).
56. For example, see the authors' introductory comments concerning "What a 'Civil
Procedure' Course is About":
There are several objectives to such a course. First, and most obviously, the
course can help you to begin learning how to handle litigation. To do that, you
must understand the purpose of each procedural device and the way it fits into
the overall scheme of dispute resolution. Secondly, you need a knowledge of
civil procedure to understand the subjects taught in your other courses. If a
case in your contracts or torts casebook has been decided as it has because the
complaint was inadequate or because the evidence does not support the verdict,
you can understand the case better by understanding the underlying procedure.
Finally, a procedure course should make you aware of ways in which our
system of justice can be improved. Just how should the jurisdiction of various
different kinds of courts be defined? How strict, or how flexible, should be our
standards for the sufficiency of papers filed with a court? Questions like these
involve deeper issues, and the best people to answer them are those who are
thoroughly familiar with our procedural system.
Crump Casebook, supra note 3, § 1.01, at 1; see also authors' comments at Note 1, id. at
77, following Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) (clarifying the "[t]wo [i]ssues in Gray"); Note 1, id. at 111, following
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (on "Understanding Shaffer: the 'Three-Way
Relationship' and the 'Fairness' Test").
57. See eg., Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 207 (prefacing Owen Equipment &
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such descriptions are recited routinely throughout the book, some savvy
students quickly will recognize the debasement of these assessments.
Other students will be lulled into an unthinking, self-congratulatory pos-
ture of having "studied" an extremely difficult subject.
Similarly, many of the authors' introductory remarks incorporate cloy-
ing editorial commentary. For example, the note on "How to Read and
Understand Pennoyer v. Neff" begins: "The case that follows, Pennoyer
v. Neff, is a venerable landmark. Some of what it says is no longer the
law today. But it would be unthinkable not to include it in this book,
because it provides such wonderful insight into the basis of our jurisdic-
tional concepts.""8
For the authors, user friendliness also entails simplified statements of
the law, case summaries, and outlines of complex doctrines. The text
does not encourage students to explore the concepts of general and spe-
cific jurisdiction; rather, the authors supply tidy black letter definitions.5 9
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court," the Supreme Court's most
recent in-depth analysis of state long arm jurisdiction, is reduced to a
two-paragraph description that characterizes the case as a "purposeful
availment" decision.6" While technically not incorrect-very little in the
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), with: "Students sometimes find the follow-
ing case to be factually complicated."); Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 382 (prefacing
Barab v. Menford, 98 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1983), with: "The case that follows, Barab v.
Menford, is short but moderately complex. You should have the following thoughts in
mind when you read it."); Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 392 (prefacing Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968), with: "The next case is
one of the most difficult cases in this book"); Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 399
(prefacing New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984), with "The case that follows is moderately
complex").
The comments following American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951),
communicate a similar message:
Confusion. Students often find § 1441(c) confusing. They are not the only ones
with that opinion. See Harper v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 [(S.D.N.Y.
1960)] ("it is not an exaggeration to say that at least on the surface the field
luxuriates in a riotous uncertainty"). There is a legitimate question whether the
policy served by § 1441(c) in the comparatively rare case to which it is applica-
ble justifies the confusion it generates.
Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 221.
58. Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 58; see, e.g., id. at 15 ("Strawbridge v. Curtiss is
a venerable old case, decided by one of this nation's most famous chief justices, and the
principle that it enunciates is still good law today."); id. at 272 (on Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943): "In this famous federal common law case ....");
Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 248-49 (on Erie: "(4) Why Law Professors Love
Erie.... The Erie decision, for all its faults, has seemed clearly right to generations of
lawyers. It is a case, like International Shoe, that you will remember the rest of your life;
and it is a case to be savored and enjoyed.").
59. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 71 & 73 (two short paragraph descrip-
tions); cf Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1988)
(extensive examination of the judicial breakdown in distinction between concepts of gen-
eral and specific jurisdiction).
60. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
61. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 97. The opinion closely relies on the lan-
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text could be subject to such harsh criticism-this neat summary treat-
ment deprives students of the opportunity to examine the Court's most
recent full-fledged treatment of jurisdiction in a challenging, interna-
tional context.62 If Asahi represents just another purposeful availment
case, why note it at all? What is missing here is attention to doctrinal
development as well as nuanced study of decisional law.
Again, in their efforts to render civil procedure user friendly, the au-
thors often predigest cases for students, or supply outlines of difficult
doctrines. The book's treatment of Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson63 typifies these pedagogical devices. Immediately pre-
ceding this case, the authors include their ever-helpful note, "How to
Read the Case."" This is introduced by the following student encour-
agement: "The next case is one of the most difficult cases in this book.
You need to keep Rules 19(a)-(b) firmly in mind as you read it. Further-
more the case is factually very complicated."65 Having thus been reas-
sured that the casebook authors and other professors know exactly how
hard the case is, the text follows with more user friendly assistance:
A Synopsis. In its simplest outline, the Provident Tradesmens case re-
sults in a holding that an absent individual, named Dutcher, is a "per-
son needed for just adjudication." It is not "feasible" to join him at
this point. The court determines, however, that the judgment can be
upheld under the four-factor "equity and good conscience" test. The
reasons for each of these holdings are complicated, however.6
Lest the message that Provident Tradesmens is a very complicated case
be lost on slower students, the authors next provide a simplified plot
guage of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985), holding that the
substantial connection between the defendant and the forum state "must come about by
an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Asahi, 107 S.
Ct. 1026, 1033 (emphasis in original). The Court in Asahi went on to note in the same
paragraph, however, that "a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or
will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the
product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State." IL
62. Id at 1031-35. The Court's decision clearly relies heavily on doctrinal refine-
ments articulated by the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Rather than
apply a unitary "purposeful availment" analysis, the Court indicated that the reasonable-
ness of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated by considering a variety of factors:
We have previously explained that the determination of the reasonableness of
the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several
factors. A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the
forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in
its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033-34 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
63. 390 U.S. 102 (1968); see Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 392-98.
64. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 392.
65. Id
66. Id
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summary of the facts. This is set forth in four easy steps to comprehen-
sion; literally, the authors' simplified version of the facts is set forth in
paragraphs denoted "Step 1, .... Step 2, .... Step 3," and "Step 4. '67 Hav-
ing been led through this process, students are now ready to read the
actual case.
Similarly, the authors use the outline-the-doctrine approach to smooth
over various rough edges of the course. The book's treatment of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 68 no doubt will raise a few eyebrows. Following
its excerpt from the Erie decision, the text offers a note on "The Sub-
stance-Procedure Distinction., 69  The authors again strike their best
"we're all in this together" tone:
A Confusing Area of Civil Procedure. The deceptive simplicity of the
Erie holding contrasts sharply with the confusion in the cases that in-
terpret it. Remember: The court follows state substantive law and
federal procedural law. The confusion has arisen primarily when the
Supreme Court has tried to tell the difference. The distinction is al-
most metaphysical, and the Court has contributed to the difficulty by
inventing new tests without overruling old ones.70
The student's resolve is thus fortified in the knowledge that the com-
plexities of the Erie doctrine are "metaphysical." By this point, students
will have come to expect their authors to simplify such complexity, and
these expectations are not disappointed. Thus, the text sets forth: "The
Approaches. It may be a good idea to sketch some of the approaches in
advance, together with the cases in which you will see them at work."'7'
Students are then served up a five-approach Erie crib sheet7z-a nice,
tidy laundry list of buzzwords and phrases that first-year students love
and law professors hate. In advance of reading the Erie cases contextu-
67. Id.
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 241-49. Again, the Erie
doctrine is introduced in a cute, down-home fashion: "Tompkins' Suit Against the Erie
Railroad. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which overruled Swift v. Tyson, is
by far the most celebrated American choice-of-law case .... The story is wonderfully
told by Irving Younger, in Younger, Wat Happened in Erie, 56 Texas L. Rev. 1011
(1978)." Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 241.
69. Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 250.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. The proferred approaches are: (1) outcome determination; (2) "absolute"
outcome determination; (3) interest balancing; (4) deference to a controlling federal rule;
and (5) the policies-of-Erie approach. See id.; cf K. Clermont, Civil Procedure 218-32
(West: Black Letter Series, 1982); M. Cohn, H. Rossen, D. Schaefer & W. Sogg, Civil
Procedure 79-100 (Smith's Review Series 2d ed. 1985); J. Friedenthal & A. Miller, Sum &
Substance of Civil Procedure 77-85 (2d ed. 1979); Redish, Federal Jurisdiction 171-82
(West: Black Letter Series, 1985).
For some other examples of the text's "overview" summaries, see Crump Casebook,
supra note 3, § 6.01, at 367-74: "An Overview of the Devices for Joining Multiple Parties
or Claims;" id., § 9.02, at 618: "Summary Judgment and Other Devices for Deciding a
Case 'As a Matter of Law;'" and, id., § 7.01, at 473-85: "The Objectives, Policies and
Planning of Discovery."
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ally, students are given a handy, pat outline (a Rosetta stone?) of Erie
doctrine. No confusing nuances here.
The objections to the casebook's approach are varied. First, it does
not challenge students to think independently. While it may be desirable
to offer background or context for cases, this text may offer too much,
causing one to yearn for the good old days of unadulterated case reports,
sans notes, comments, materials, or author intrusion. Under those cir-
cumstances, students had to struggle with the case itself, legal warts and
all. There is something to be said for this struggle: it hones skills of
comprehension, analysis, and critical evaluation. This is not to argue in
favor of senseless student suffering, but there may be some substance to
the currently popular adage "no pain, no gain."
Second, this casebook not only fails to challenge students to think in-
dependently, but it often tells them what to think. While this is done in
the spirit of reassuring helpfulness, it denies students the opportunity to
assess the relative difficulty or complexity of cases and issues. If some
fact situation is problematic, as in Provident Tradesmens, the authors
break down the facts into understandable tidbits. If the law is complex
or obscure, the authors supply an outline of the concepts.7 3
Third, the text's subliminal message about the complexity of law is
very troubling. Students are advised repeatedly that virtually everything
they are reading is complex; they are not allowed to arrive independently
at this conclusion. It is difficult to guess the import of this. If the pur-
pose is to make first-year students feel good, then this text imparts to
them a false confidence in their ability to grapple with complex legal
materials. Beyond this pedagogical objection, however, the authors
sometimes employ a disturbing, dismissive attitude towards untidy legal
problems. For example, the authors summarize Erie doctrine thus:
An Analogy. The will-o'-the-wisp distinction between substance and
procedure calls for an analogy. In an elementary physics class, stu-
dents would be introduced to two apparently inconsistent theories
about the phenomenon that we know as light. The "particle" theory
describes light as particles called photons. This theory is useful to de-
scribe some characteristics of light. The "wave" theory instead sees
light as electromagnetic waves, and it is useful in describing other phe-
nomena (eg., color). Which theory is the "correct" one? The answer
is that both of them are, and yet neither is. In an attempt to describe a
unique property of the universe, the physicists have invented crude
models. It is not surprising that no single model fits all cases. And so
it is with the substance-procedure distinction. The Erie doctrine is a
complex idea, and it cannot be fully described by any single formula. 74
The purpose of this analogy is to reiterate the theme of complexity in
relation to the Erie doctrine. The message, however, is that there are no
correct answers, or, alternatively, many correct answers, and that Erie
73. For example, see the discussion of Erie, supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
74. Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 250.
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doctrine can be described in many different ways. Of course, this is
vaguely correct, but it ignores the fact that there is an accepted Erie anal-
ysis, and that federal courts consistently recognize this methodology in
their opinions." Students, then, have an easy out: instead of rigorous
analysis, they may substitute their understanding that the Erie doctrine is
complex, but that all answers are equally acceptable. After all, as the
authors so pertinently query, "Which theory is the 'correct' one?"'7 6
Perhaps it is a petty cavil to suggest at this point that even the
"Problems" in this text are user friendly. The selection of a problem for
review yielded the following "What color is George Washington's white
horse?" question:
PROBLEM D
APPLYING THE FEDERAL VENUE STATUTES. Plaintiff A, a
resident of San Francisco (in the Northern District of California), has
been injured in an automobile collision occurring in Los Angeles(within the Central District of California), as a result of the careless
operations of a car driven by Defendant B, a resident of the Boston
Division of the District of Massachusetts.
(1) Venue in Diversity Cases. Identify the three places of proper
venue for a diversity action by A against B. [Note: Section 1391(a) of
the venue provisions governs; it designates the places where "all plain-
tiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose."] 77
You, too, can feel good about civil procedure.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Thus, the Crump casebook's overarching conception bodes a return to
an older, more genteel pedagogy. From this perspective, "the law" is
some received body of principles to be studied, learned, mastered, and
recited for the bar. The introduction of the Socratic method of case
study ended that era. Socratic teaching demonstrates that memorization
of black letter law is unavailing to help distinguish hard cases. It recog-
nizes that the law is manifested in cases that often are untidy, inconsis-
tent, and incorrect-that the law is not a fixed universe, but a body of
principles evolving in the light of ever-changing circumstances, exper-
iences, and values.
Socratic methodology does not just teach the law. It teaches future
75. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067-71 (11th Cir.) (en
banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
76. See Crump Casebook, supra note 3, at 250.
77. Id. at 138-39. This problem was selected randomly by flipping open the text to
the first problem fortuitously encountered. The problem is accompanied by an illustra-
tive diagram. See id. at 139 (Figure 2B: Illustration of Venue Problem (No. 2C)). In
fairness, the authors subsequently develop eight increasingly complex venue problems
arising from the basic litigation premise. See id. at 139-40. The answer to Problem D, by
the way, is: the Northern District of California, the Central District of California, or the
Boston Division of the District of Massachusetts.
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lawyers how to think about the law. The Crump casebook teaches the
law-but who will teach its students to think?
78
78. For a stimulating discussion of trends in modern casebooks, see D'Amato, The
Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 3. Legal Educ.
461 (1987). Professor D'Amato observes:
But casebooks have evolved along the lines of becoming easier and easier for
the students to read and digest. The old casebooks challenged the student to
think, to figure out why the cases were placed in that order, and what the rela-
tionships were, if any, among a case and the ones preceding and following it.
The new casebooks tell the student these things.
Just from a quantitative point of view, the amount of space devoted to cases is
steadily decreasing, while the space devoted to explaining what the cases stand
for is increasing. Cases are whittled down into snippets of cases in order to
make more room for authors' "notes" and "comments." While some authors
retain a vestige of the old "questions" sections, they actually proceed to answer
their own questions, saving the students the mental strain. Why present un-
solved problems for the students in a casebook?-that would only cause the
students [a]nxiety and hurt sales.
Id. at 485.
Professor D'Amato also recognizes the historical drift of casebooks:
By the late 1950s, casebooks had shifted in this "modem" direction. The
way to get a feel for what the really old turn-of-the-century casebooks were like
is to look them up in a law library that has not discarded them. One's first
impression is that they seem extraordinarily primitive. They hardly have any
notes at all. Cases are not excerpted very much; there is little sign that the
editors have done their work or earned their keep. More than that, the cases do
not seem quite to fit the chapter headings and subheadings! It appears that the
compilers of those casebooks were rather lazy, not taking the care that editors
take these days to select cases precisely and then hack them down so that the
language remaining supports the exact proposition of law that the editor has in
mind.
A second look is needed. The "old" casebooks resemble the research that an
attorney does in practice. A practicing attorney, looking up cases in a general
area, will never find a nicely edited group of cases illustrating a precise rule;
rather, some cases will be on point and others off point, either confirming a rule
or disconfirming it, distinguishing each other or failing to recognize contrary
precedent. The practicing attorney must then do a tremendous mental job of
filing and sorting those cases not just according to their decisional rules but also
according to their facts, to what the parties were trying to achieve, and to their
procedural history. The modern casebook editor does all of this work in pre-
paring the casebook, leaving none of it for the student to do. By doing more
and more editorial work, modern casebook compilers are in fact doing less and
less for the teaching process. In retrospect, the "old" casebook editors were
pretty subtle; their editorial work showed up not in notes and comments, but in
the perceptive selection and ordering of cases that could efficiently be used as
vehicles for creative problem solving.
Id. at 485-86.

